With the advent of electronic voting systems, secrecy and invisibility have increasingly been built-in to our election systems. In fact, we now have invisible ballots, invisible ballot counting, invisible tabulation and aggregation, invisible audit trails, and invisible recounts. In addition, we have invisible "proprietary" software source code, which even election officials have been prohibited from inspecting.

Plans for invisible electronic voter registration, invisible electronic voter sign-in, and invisible voter list management services, performed by private vendors, are already well under way. Florida Gov. Jeb Bush, brother of President George W. Bush, has now passed a law removing the requirement for witness signatures on absentee ballots in Florida. As such, we now have invisible witnesses to invisible signatures on America's absentee ballots.

All transparency and accountability in our elections are being erased, such that virtually any input or outcome in our elections may be manipulated without risk of detection.

As a critical check on this invisibility and to ensure the integrity of this election, we have proposed a simple system to be implemented in the 2004 General Election.

The Manual Parallel Accounting Control System: The MPACS Solution

As a key element of the proposed simultaneous strategic actions on multiple fronts, the National Ballot Integrity Project Task Force has proposed the MPACS (Manual Parallel Accounting Control System) [pronounced em - paks.] The MPACS Solution consists of simply running the manual systems in parallel with the automation (electronic voting machines), as a check on the accuracy of the automation now being integrated into America's election systems.

Top computer security and accounting systems experts have reported that parallel systems checks have long been standard practice, in industry, in periods of transition between manual and automated systems. These experts add that it is unheard of for an organization to plunge into automation without first running a parallel systems check.

So, we ask, "Why are we doing it as a nation??"

“Conversion strategies” specify how a new system should replace an old one. Systems-development literature cites 4 basic types. The “Plunge” strategy -- i.e. “pull the plug” on the old system and start using the new system without a backup -- is the most risky. One must place complete trust in the accuracy and proper functioning of the new system in a “live scenario.” This strategy should never be used when implementing complex or critical applications (e.g. air-traffic control systems or presidential elections). For such applications, the “Parallel” strategy — i.e. running the old system in parallel with the new one until the new one demonstrates its reliability — is strongly advised.

For this Presidential election, many counties in America are being pressured to “plunge” into automated election systems using unverifiable electronic voting machines (from Diebold, ES&S, Sequoia, Hart InterCivic, and other vendors) placing at risk the very heart of our democracy.

This very serious problem can be overcome with uniform implementation of the MPACS, as a parallel systems check of the automation in the November 2004 Presidential Election.

For the greatest possible potential for transparency, accountability, the security and integrity of our elections, the National Ballot Integrity Project calls immediately for the uniform implementation of the MPACS in the November 2004 General Election, as follows:

1. Voter-verified paper ballots for all federal and state offices (including printed ballots, optical scan/mark sense and punch card ballots, as well as voter verified paper ballots produced by touch-screen machines). Those jurisdictions whose equipment does not produce such ballots must use printed ballots for all state and federal offices.
2. Hand-counting of all votes (cast both in-person and absentee, with witness signature) for federal and state offices, conducted by the election judges at the precinct/polling place, with citizen oversight and assistance, immediately upon close of polls, with the results of this hand-count serving as the official tally.
3. Vote totals recorded immediately upon completion of the hand-count in triplicate on official report forms and signed by all election officials and observers present.
4. Immediate public and prominent posting at the polling place of one signed copy of the official hand-count. All ballots sealed in the ballot box, along with all tally sheets and one signed copy of the official report form. The sealed ballot box and remaining signed copy of the official report form are to be delivered directly to the controlling election officials.
5. Official election results will be compiled directly from the signed tally sheets/report forms from each polling place. No central servers or other tallying mechanism(s) manufactured, sold, leased or promoted by any manufacturer or vendor of any type of electronic voting equipment may be used to aggregate these results. Election authorities must retain all paper ballots, tally sheets and all signed copies of the official report form, in a secure location until the statute of limitation expires.
6. Computerized voting machines producing voter-verified paper ballots may be used in addition to, but not in lieu of, the Manual Parallel Accounting Control System. Machine counts may be processed in the usual manner, after the ballots have been counted by hand, with the resulting machine counts compared to the totals derived from the hand counts described above to determine the accuracy and completeness of the machine counts at the polling place/precinct, city, county, state and federal levels. The hand counts shall be the control by which the accuracy of the machine counts is measured.

7. Observation by citizen poll watchers of all ballot counting, tallying and aggregation, both by hand and by machine, at any location where any phase of the process of counting the vote occurs.
8. The paper ballots shall be the only instruments possessing legal vote status, and the hand-count will serve as the official basis for all 2004 state and federal election results at each level and phase of the process. The results of the MPACS test will generate substantive proof of the accuracy and reliability of all types of machines in use in all jurisdictions on Election Day.
9. Publicly funded nonpartisan exit polls shall be conducted and reported on Election Day for key federal elections. The Manual Parallel Accounting Control System (MPACS) described above provides the following benefits:

• Low-cost to implement
• No new equipment or printing costs for most jurisdictions.
• Transparency of the process to voters.
• No undue delay in completing the count, as manual ballot counting will be conducted by the election judges at the individual polling places, with an average of less than 400 ballots to be counted per polling place, and seldom more than 10 state and federal offices to be counted by hand in each jurisdiction.
• No excessive burden upon election officials at any level of the process.
• Greater citizen participation in and commitment to voting and working in elections.
• Substantive determination of the accuracy and reliability of electronic voting and vote-counting equipment and processes in actual use.
• Invaluable experience, information, and knowledge upon which to draw in making critical decisions about the future of our democracy.

Key Advantages of the 2004 MPACS Solution include:

• The hand counting of paper ballots is legal in 49 of the 50 states. (Georgia is the sole exception.)
• Legislation may not be required to institute the control system.
• Lawsuits or court orders may not be required to institute the control system.
• The use of parallel manual and computerized accounting systems follows standard accounting practice used during periods of system transition in government and business.
• The paper ballot/hand count system is streamlined, has already been developed, and is being used successfully in Canada and New Hampshire. Polling places in these jurisdictions typically take less than four hours to hand count ballots with 10 or fewer open offices.
• The simple paper ballot/hand count system is easy for election officials, the media and voters to understand.
• The cost of implementation will be minimal and well within the budgetary constraints of local election boards.
• Election judges, poll watchers, and citizen volunteers can be quickly trained to track vote counts using preprinted tally sheets.

The MPACS "2004 Solution" is well suited to a broad citizens' movement. This grassroots movement will demand the use of a Manual Parallel Accounting Control System in all polling places relying on the use of computerized voting equipment used to record, count and report federal and state election results in the November 2004 General Election.